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POLICY BRIEF
German Council on Foreign Relations
City Diplomacy:  
The EU’s Hidden  
Capacity to Act
Under the auspices of the EU, mayors are beginning to act like 
diplomats, brokering deals and defusing geopolitical disputes. 
On the one hand, such “city diplomacy” offers benefits: cities are 
reaching spots that the EU ordinarily cannot, flipping conventional 
hierarchies and making big issues seem small. On the other, it is 
potentially destabilizing in an era in which the exercise of power 
can have far-reaching consequences. Harnessing the activism of 
cities will be difficult, but not impossible. 
 – While Lebanon and Belarus mark failures of EU foreign pol-
icy, they have been minor success stories for EU city diplomacy. 
Across the EU’s neighborhood, EU cities have begun to broker 
deals, address territorial splits, and reaffirm the role of human 
intelligence in international relations.
 – Although the EU had seemed to be on the verge of formalizing 
city diplomacy, the practice remains improvised. A handful of 
cities are thus eroding the EU’s monopoly on diplomacy, speak-
ing as if on behalf of the EU while only being accountable to a 
few voters. 
 – To properly harness city diplomacy, the EU must face up to  
current weaknesses at both its top and bottom. Three concepts 
can ensure cohesive city diplomacy: “local affairs first,” “counter-
balancing the center,” and “opportunism needs structure.” 
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In its 2016 Global Strategy, the EU clearly stated that 
promoting reform was the best way to stave off crisis 
in the states on its eastern and southern flanks.1 This 
argument has been eloquently confirmed by the cur-
rent turmoil in Belarus, Lebanon, and the Aegean – 
as have the EU’s own shortcomings.
In Beirut, the lack of reform literally proved explo-
sive. Although the EU Commission had pinpoint-
ed sclerotic border and port management as a risk 
and even deployed a reform program and liaison of-
ficer there, it failed to adapt to local conditions, in-
stead trying unsuccessfully to export the EU’s own 
border model. Europe’s diplomats had the opposite 
problem. They preferred to work with the status quo 
and local elites rather than risk triggering destabiliz-
ing reforms. For example, it is no secret that Euro-
pean governments came to rely on the Shi’ite major 
general who watches over Beirut’s seaports and air-
ports, as well as the highway to Damascus, to hold 
back the flow of Sunni refugees and terrorists from 
Syria. Indeed, Europe’s diplomats may have allowed 
the militant Shi’ite group Hezbollah to piggyback on 
that relationship. They turned a blind eye when Hez-
bollah exploited the sea and air routes through Bei-
rut for its own nefarious purposes. 
Against the backdrop of Beirut’s devastation, there 
have been calls for new forms of EU engagement 
abroad – including city diplomacy.2 A port city like 
Rotterdam can offer Beirut not only relevant ex-
pertise, but also advice on novel ways to soften its 
politics. Europe’s cities have already made a contri-
bution in the Levant, where they brought city rep-
resentatives from hostile countries together in ways 
impossible at the national level.3 They have also pro-
moted cross-border cooperation and improved wa-
ter management in this parched terrain, all under an 
EU umbrella. 
1  European Union External Action Service, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe,” June 2016, p. 23:  
<https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf> (accessed September 8, 2020).
2  Government of the Netherlands, “Intervention by Sigrid Kaag at the International Conference of Support and Assistance to Beirut,” August 9, 2020: 
<https://www.government.nl/documents/speeches/2020/08/09/intervention-by-sigrid-kaag-at-the-international-conference-of-support-and-assistance-
to-beirut> (accessed September 8, 2020).
3  See, for instance, the attendees at the January 2020 plenary session of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly, coordinated by the EU’s 
Committee of the Regions.
4  Maggie Michael, “Backed by Italy, Libya enlists militias to stop migrants,” AP News, August 29, 2017:  
<https://apnews.com/9e808574a4d04eb38fa8c688d110a23d> (accessed September 8, 2020).
THREE VECTORS OF EU 
CITY DIPLOMACY
In the EU’s eastern and southern neighborhoods, EU 
cities are currently practicing diplomacy along three 
strands:
As Players
The EU’s cities are learning to broker deals, focusing 
on weak states – for example, Libya. Central author-
ity in Libya has all but collapsed, depriving the EU of 
a channel to engage. While EU diplomats have gen-
erally responded by “going high,” seeking UN back-
ing for action, Europe’s cities and regions have gone 
“low,” making contact to mayors, the only Libyans 
with an undisputed democratic mandate.
Mayors in Libya, as in other weak states, can po-
tentially form a bedrock in the political quicksand. 
All are adamant that their citizens will not fall vic-
tim to militias and terrorists, and they have vowed 
to prevent migrants from falling prey to traffick-
ers. The mayors share these aims because many of 
them suffered persecution at the hands of former 
leader Muammar el-Qaddafi, who brutally played 
cities off one another – foremost Benghazi and Trip-
oli. Last year, representatives of EU cities helped 
bring the mayors of these former rivals to Brussels. 
There, the pair reconciled and laid out their expec-
tations of the EU, which marked a small but signifi-
cant breakthrough.
Europe’s cities have done as much as anyone to ex-
punge Qaddafi’s legacy, also helping a cluster of eight 
Libyan mayors to work together on everything from 
waste management to countering violent extremism. 
The constructive role of EU cities compares favor-
ably with the machinations of diplomats from some 
member states. In 2017, when Italy became aware of 
how useful Libyan cities might be in stemming mi-
gration, it reputedly sponsored the establishment of 
Brigade 48, a militia to guard oil refineries and cut 
migration flows.4 Although Italy then co-opted Liby-
an mayors into supporting this brigade, it soon dete-
riorated into an urban protection racket.
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As Places
Europe’s cities are defusing territorial tensions in the 
EU’s neighborhood by using their newly discovered 
talent for geostrategy. Town planning and urban ad-
ministration involve controlling space across time – 
the epitome of geostrategy, albeit on a very modest 
scale. Europe’s cities and regions have put this talent 
to good use in the Eastern Neighborhood, where five 
of the EU’s six partner states are embroiled in ter-
ritorial issues, with Belarus in danger of completing 
the set. In Ukraine, local EU authorities have helped 
redraw administrative boundaries, facilitating a ten-
tative decentralization of power.5 
These local authorities could well achieve something 
there that Europe’s diplomats have long desired. Eu-
ropean diplomats view decentralization and bound-
ary change as a means of protecting minorities in the 
neighborhood, giving them language rights or proper 
access to healthcare, and so stemming secessionist 
tendencies. But Kyiv, Chisinau, and Tbilisi have con-
sistently rebuffed their overtures; they fear “feder-
alization” would see them divided into Russian and 
pro-European spheres of influence. Yet they do seem 
to trust Europe’s local authorities with the task be-
cause these players have no geopolitical blueprint for 
the country as a whole. 
The EU Commission has its own way of dealing with 
territorial problems in the neighborhood, which like-
wise reduces big tensions to technical trifles. The 
Commission typically dispatches a group of border 
experts to depoliticize the situation in the disputed 
area, then links territories up in a “macro-region” or 
giant transport corridor. But Moscow says it no lon-
ger sees the presence of EU border experts as neu-
tral. And Beijing is turning questions of cross-border 
connectivity into high geopolitics. This helps ex-
plain why the Commission’s Directorate-General for 
Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG 
NEAR) has begun to use Europe’s cities and regions 
as partners.
As Percolators 
European city representatives have become anten-
nae, picking up social and political signals abroad. 
Because they are transparent about Europe’s own 
problems and keep their ears open for policy ideas, 
they hear things that EU diplomats do not. Europe’s 
5  See the Ukraine Task Force: <https://cor.europa.eu/en/our-work/Pages/Ukraine.aspx> (accessed September 8, 2020). Poland has, for example, undergone 
a decentralization of power, and local Polish authorities have clear ideas about the optimal borough size.
6  Alice Ekman, “China’s Smart Cities: The New Geopolitical Battleground,” Etudes de l’Ifri, December 2019:  
<https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/etudes-de-lifri/chinas-smart-cities-new-geopolitical-battleground> (accessed September 8, 2020).
mayors will not, for example, have been surprised 
by the boldness of the uprising in Belarus. A group 
of them visited there in 2017 to see what they could 
learn. Belarusian mayors are, after all, at the fore-
front of the digitalization of public services. One rea-
son for this is that they use the internet to give vent 
to local frustrations. 
EU officials are not always so receptive to such sig-
nals. They still see it as their role to export Euro-
pean policies and tend to place countries into rigid 
categories according to their convergence with EU 
norms. EU diplomats would not sit down as equals 
with representatives of, say, Turkey or Ukraine, let 
alone bring them together to discuss shared con-
cerns such as cooperation related to the Black Sea. 
Europe’s cities have no such hang-ups. Kyiv and An-
kara – with populations of 2.9 million and 5.5 million, 
respectively – dwarf them. Consequently, European 
mayors would not dare lecture them or place them in 
Eurocentric categories. 
But Europe’s city diplomats would be the first to ac-
knowledge how much they profit from the EU and 
its foreign policy apparatus. The EU’s mercurial in-
ternational status has helped them escape the stale 
conventions of national city diplomacy – twinning, 
tourism, and technical cooperation – and avoid be-
ing hijacked by governments who see it as a matter 
of prestige to set the global template for the “smart 
megacity.”6 The EU offers mayors space to exper-
iment, an attractive alternative to the rather pro-
grammatic activities of the Council of Europe and 
the sometimes empty hype of UN city diplomacy.  
HARNESSING EU CITY DIPLOMACY
If EU city diplomacy has transformed into some-
thing unusually geopolitical, it is largely thanks to 
the Committee of the Regions (CoR). Founded in 
1994, the CoR spent its first decade focusing on lo-
cal issues and EU enlargement, downsizing this lat-
ter strand of its work in 2004. But as of 2008, it built 
up two international fora: the Conference of Region-
al and Local Authorities for the Eastern Partnership 
(CORLEAP) and the Euro-Mediterranean Regional 
and Local Assembly (ARLEM). These fora, which con-
vene local representatives from their respective re-
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gions, proved especially useful in 2015 when a wave 
of international migration and terrorism hit the EU. 
The spine of EU city diplomacy is provided by the 
CoR’s Commission for Citizenship, Governance, In-
stitutional, and External Affairs (CIVEX). Its members 
oversee the CoR’s international activities, and its 
secretariat supports CORLEAP and ARLEM. But if the 
structured core of EU city diplomacy is provided by 
CIVEX, its outer bounds remain amorphous. Before 
playing a role in Libya, Ukraine, and Belarus, Europe-
an cities and regions had to clear significant hurdles: 
a formal request from the third country, the deter-
mined efforts of a mayor or regional representative 
in the CoR, and a funder to foot the bill.
The results have been hit-and-miss. While the EU’s 
cities and local authorities can act as implement-
ers for EU development cooperation, they are not 
a routine reference point for the Commission’s Di-
rectorate-General for International Cooperation and 
Development (DG DEVCO) as compared to “civil so-
ciety” or “the social partners.” Consequently, DEV-
CO has cultivated its own relations to African cities 
without the mediation of EU cities, meaning it large-
ly ignores the CoR’s web of small-town partners and 
focuses on Africa’s metropolises instead. Sometimes, 
it uses aid implementers who do not cover war-torn 
cities like Benghazi, hotspots where EU towns and 
cities still readily engage. 
A LOSS OF MOMENTUM 
The scattergun role of cities is ripe for rationaliza-
tion. Last year, the CoR successfully brought to fru-
ition several pilot projects that, together, offered a 
convincing proof of concept for a formal EU city di-
plomacy. The outgoing High Representative and 
Neighborhood Commissioner appeared convinced, 
and cities seemed set to receive a green light to real-
ly act along the three strands outlined above:
1. As players building “islands of security” in weak 
states such as Libya or Syria;
2. As places promoting decentralization in broken 
states such Ukraine or Georgia;
3. And as percolators spreading ideas about good 
governance in places more or less closed to diplo-
mats such as Palestine or Belarus.  
THE CoR CAN COORDINATE CITIES AND REGIONS AS PLAYERS  
BUILDING RESILIENCE ESPECIALLY IN WEAK STATES
Middle-East 
flashpoints
Azeri-Armenian 
Conflict
East-West Ukraine East-West Libya Refugee Protection 
in Home Regions
Brexit/  
Northern Ireland
Yerevan
Kharkiv
Nicosia
Benghazi
Zintan
Tripoli
Kyiv
Nakhchivan  
Autonomous Republic
Bethlehem
Ramallah
Modi’in- 
Maccabim-Re’ut
Oisterwijk
Flevoland Bremen
Valencia
Clonmel
Galicia
Prachatice
Brussels
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THE CoR CAN OFFER A PLATFORM TO CITIES AND REGIONS AS PERCOLATORS 
TO HELP SPREAD IDEAS
Climate and MigrationCity Diplomacy EU-Africa Exchange UN Sustainable Development Goal 11
Budapest
Bratislava
Prague
North Rhine Westphalia
Nouvelle AcquitaineGalicia
Al Hoceima
Algiers
Coulaines
Rabat
Basque 
Country
Catalonia
Nicosia
Seville
Warsaw
THE CoR CAN SUPPORT CITIES AND REGIONS AS PLACES 
TO DEFUSE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS
Decentralization Political Transition Local Elections Migration Cooperation Fisheries
Mariupol
KharkivVinnytsia
Minsk
Mostar
Salzburg
Karlstad
GrodnoGdansk
Radlo
Galicia
Venezia Giulia
Sirte
Tobruk
Nicosia
Edirne
Izmir
Haskovo
Brussels
Brussels
RamallahGanei Tikval
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That momentum has, however, been lost due to a 
series of unexpected setbacks. First, an overhaul of 
the role of local authorities in EU policymaking – the 
Timmermans Reform – confined itself to internal EU 
affairs. Second, some of the CoR’s most active city 
diplomats lost their seats, a perpetual problem in a 
forum with a constant turnover of members. Third, 
the CoR’s new president proved reluctant to embrace 
international affairs (reputedly for fear of jeopardiz-
ing his native Greece’s line on Turkey and Russia). 
And, fourth, a reform of the EU aid budget failed to 
produce the €500 million for which local authorities 
had hoped. 
But it is a fifth development – the coronavirus pan-
demic – that has most slowed momentum. Before 
the spread of COVID-19, the CoR had been expect-
ed to create a new committee for external affairs, 
breaking up CIVEX, which covers both home (“CIV-”) 
and external (“-EX”) affairs. Now, it seems that 
the CoR will not only retain CIVEX, but it also may 
shrink its external work. With its members focusing 
on meeting the local challenges of recovery, CoR is 
returning to a classic understanding of subsidiarity, 
the principle that political action should occur at the 
lowest possible level.7 EU diplomats and the Com-
mission DGs NEAR and DEVCO are likewise focusing 
on their core business – improving the worsening 
international mood. 
THE RE-CENTRALIZATION OF  
FOREIGN POLICY
The trouble with this return to first principles is that 
they no longer apply. Subsidiarity became a gener-
al principle of EU law in 1993, during an era in which 
local affairs were still clearly local, and the EU had 
few good reasons for encroaching on them. Now, 
things are less clear cut. Local matters have become 
issues of geopolitical competition, placing them 
squarely in the realm of the EU’s trained diplomats. 
As China, Russia, and Turkey exploit the EU’s socie-
tal vulnerabilities, Europe’s diplomats can legitimate-
ly claim to be the right ones to deal with everything 
7  Glossary of Summaries, “Subsidiarity” as defined by Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, EUR-Lex:  
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/subsidiarity.html> (accessed September 8, 2020).
8  Belarus was due to take on the co-chair of CORLEAP in October 2020; not all the Belarusian representatives are mayors or locally-elected officials.
9  Betty Herschman, “Changing the Demographics of Jerusalem,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 13, 2017:  
<https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/75006> (accessed September 8, 2020).
10  The CoR previously aligned with the Council of Europe to send election observers to Eastern Europe, but the affiliation of its members was not always 
clear to local reporters there.
11  After the religious wars of the 16th century, a town in a Protestant area would either defy its overlord in order to associate with a Catholic town or call 
on the protection of the pope. This unsatisfactory state of affairs spurred the development of “subsidiarity” as a right of communities to associate across 
boundaries.
from internet provision to healthcare or asylum pro-
cessing. Today, subsidiarity justifies a centralization 
of local affairs.
With the stakes so high, European diplomats are also 
losing their appetite to consult cities on these local 
matters, let alone give them a front-line role abroad. 
They tend to view Europe’s mayors and regional po-
tentates as blundering amateurs – dilettante diplo-
mats who do not understand that a partnership with 
a Belarusian mayor can undermine the EU’s whole 
sanctions regime,8 that an urban boundary change 
in Israel can have massive geopolitical ramifications,9 
or that, by posing as an election observer in Ukraine, 
they are representing the EU itself.10 
Some EU mayors are even considered pawns and 
proxies. Because mayors are seldom rewarded by 
their voters for playing an active international role, 
they must logically have an ulterior motive. Sure 
enough, in Hungary, mayors who are members of Fi-
desz, the ruling party, use the international sphere 
to launder the reputation of Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán; simultaneously, opposition-run Budapest uses 
it to attack the government. In Flanders and Cata-
lonia, mayors use their international profile to dif-
ferentiate themselves from the national position. In 
Turkey, Russia, and China, national leaders may ex-
ploit local divisions in the EU or deploy their own pet 
mayors to alter territorial boundaries abroad, citing 
an EU precedent. 
PRESSURE FOR  
DE-CENTRALIZATION 
The CoR still contains committed proponents of EU 
city diplomacy who make a case for broad new rights 
to cooperate abroad. They say that subsidiarity was 
never just a principle of vertical organization; rath-
er, it is also a principle of horizontal association. It 
dates to a time of city states and confers an ancient 
right to associate with other cities without being 
constrained by borders imposed from above.11 These 
mayors thus want DEVCO and NEAR to provide them 
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with cash without strings, arguing that there are 
enough problems in the world to enable them to act 
without ever stepping on the toes of the EU.
Advocates of city diplomacy point to examples of 
mayors having successfully corrected the EU’s top-
heavy foreign policy. Recently, for example, the EU 
Commission – supported by Europe’s food indus-
try and Italy’s hungry fishing fleet – offered Libyan 
ports help to modernize their fishing practices. Eu-
ropean cities and regions stepped in to ensure a bot-
tom-up approach. An Italian port that runs a fishing 
cooperative joined forces with a Spanish town that 
excels in fish processing and so on. They construct-
ed an exemplary value chain, which helped Libyan 
ports avoid the heavy industrial approach of Europe-
an fisheries policy. 
Mayors can also claim credit for professionalizing as-
pects of the EU’s diplomacy. The Covenant of Mayors 
is one such example. Envisioned by the Commission 
as a PR exercise to showcase European climate ef-
forts, the Covenant was transformed into a global 
phenomenon by Europe’s mayors. Cities everywhere 
now sign up to its motivational climate goals. Still, it 
seems the Commission has not yet learned its les-
son. It recently launched a new PR blitz – a “Climate 
Pact” – that threatens to duplicate the earlier exer-
cise by encouraging cities and civil society to sign 
up to a similar set of commitments. It is also uneasy 
about passing on ownership of the Covenant to Mi-
chael Bloomberg, the ex-mayor of New York.
THREE PRINCIPLES FOR EU  
CITY DIPLOMACY
Today’s global politics – in a “G-zero world”12 pop-
ulated by power players such as China, Russia, and 
Turkey – are characterized by two contradictory 
traits: they are both diffuse and centralized. The EU 
is struggling to adapt. Although it has tried to build 
coherence by centralizing its foreign policy, this has 
alienated vital local players like cities. That has de-
creased the decentralized range of channels through 
which it needs to exercise influence. As the levers of 
power shrink, its central institutions are competing 
to control them. Far from becoming more coherent, 
12  “G-Zero” is a reference to a perceived shift away from the preeminence of the Group of Seven industrialized countries and the expanded Group of 
Twenty, which includes major emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil, Turkey, and others.
13  EU cities tend to have good relations with states that are actively pursuing accession to the EU and poor relations to laggards. While Turkey has recently 
shown an interest in deepening its links with EU cities and the CoR, the negative turn in EU-Turkey relations has meant that the CoR has not been able to 
reciprocate. Only on rare occasions have EU cities and regions driven developments forward – for example, in the Western Balkans, when, in 2019, the then-
president of the CoR visited Skopje or, more recently, when the CoR and Council of Europe teamed up to promote local elections in Mostar. 
the EU is tugging itself apart at the top and weaken-
ing its influence at the bottom. 
The Commission is attempting to assert its con-
trol of EU foreign policy by using its power of the 
purse. The president of the European Council has 
responded by trying to repatriate prerogatives from 
the EU, then seeking a shared European line among 
national leaders. And the High Representative now 
spends his time mediating between these inter-
nal stakeholders rather than seeking to expand the 
EU’s range of international interlocutors. Meanwhile, 
there is still no critical mass to constitute an EU city 
diplomacy. It is driven by just a few activist mayors, 
and their enthusiasm would be crushed by attempts 
at top-down control. 
Still, every cloud has a silver lining. The EU’s fail-
ure to create a framework for city diplomacy may 
yet prove to be a lucky escape. The best results have 
come about by happy accident – for example, when 
mayors were free to adopt the mantle of “EU city 
diplomats” where suitable or to elide it by working 
through representatives of Europe’s regions where a 
broader approach was more effective. In contrast, in 
the few fields in which the EU has closely integrated 
mayors into its foreign policy, it has blunted them – 
for example, in EU enlargement policy.13 The EU can 
harmoniously harness this dynamic if it adopts three 
new principles.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The first principle is counter-intuitive: “local affairs 
first.” The fact that the CoR is focusing inward need 
not imply a zero-sum shift away from foreign affairs. 
Rather, it could be the catalyst for finally establish-
ing cities as a cohesive group in EU affairs. The task 
is to ensure that this internal cohesion is transferred 
outward – and here the continued link between 
“CIV-” and “-EX” could prove vital. The same can 
be said of the European External Action Service’s 
own inward turn. As the EEAS improves relations 
between stakeholders inside the EU, it might train 
city officials or even hire them in fields like strate-
gic communications. The long-term result would be 
a cadre of city diplomats.
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The second principle is “counterbalancing the cen-
ter.” As the Commission and European Council drive 
a top-heavy foreign policy, cities can offer a useful 
counterweight. But they must do so in a concerted 
way. When DEVCO focuses on large African cities, 
for example, the CoR has a justification to develop a 
web of smaller development initiatives. When NEAR 
butts heads with leaders in the Western Balkans, cit-
ies have grounds to seek out willing partners at the 
local level. And when EU leaders reach out to au-
tocratic counterparts like Turkish President Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan, European mayors can try to open 
channels to opposition and Kurdish mayors. 
The third principle is a matter of alchemy: “oppor-
tunism needs structure.” Although the EU clearly 
needs to graduate from its sui generis approach to 
city diplomacy, it cannot afford to smother the ran-
dom interactions that bring city diplomacy to life. 
What it needs is a personality to guide these amalga-
mations, studying their strange contours and spot-
ting opportunities. In this regard, one name pops up 
repeatedly: Donald Tusk. The former prime minis-
ter of Poland and former president of the Europe-
an Council is a man known for his attachment to 
Gdansk, a city with a defined international profile. 
Free-floating, such a person would be at home at 
the lowest and highest levels of EU politics, but not 
bound to either. 
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